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THOMAS FARMER v. GREGORY & STAGG.
When an agreement is reduced to writing, and although not signed, is acted upon
by the parties, parol evidence is not, in the absence of fraud or mistake, admissible
to add to, vary or contradict its terms.
Where a warehouseman sells goods in his warehouse under a general authority
to sell, given to him by the owner, the property passes and he may give a second
,warehouse receipt to the purchaser, notwithstanding there is a receipt still in the
hands of the first owner. The Kentucky Warehouse Act of 1869, prohibiting the
issue of a second warehouse receipt without the production of the first, does not
apply to such a case.
ACTION to recover possession of goods described in a warehouse
receipt. The facts of the case were as follows: Taylor issued to
Gregory & Stagg, a warehouse receipt for certain barrels of
whiskey. At the same time Gregory & Stagg entered into the
following agreement with Taylor:
"We make advances in money or accept drafts for a commission
of 2j per cent., this to cover two renewals of four months' paper,
making the commission 2j per cent. per annum. The paper we
take we discount at 10 per cent. per annum. When you can do
better at home, we will accept your drafts, the amount per gallon
or barrel for purposes of collateral to be agreed upon. Free goods
we usually do not go beyond three-fourths the cash value, we to
have one dollar per barrel on sales in bond of all goods advanced
on, whether we sell, or you make sale, and 21 per cent. on all taxpaid goods advanced on, sold by us or you. When required to
guarantee sales, we charge 2j per cent. conimission on amounts so
guaranteed; when sale is made of goods advanced on by us, and
you do not require the guarantee, other goods can be placed in our
hands, as collateral in their stead. , We can carry, on the above
terms all you want carried, and as long as it will pay you to carry."
This agreement was reduced to writing, but not signed by the
parties. Afterwards Taylor sold the whiskey to Farmer and issued
to him a warehouse receipt therefor, Farmer having no notice of
the outstanding receipt to Gregory & Stagg. This action was
afterwards brought by Farmer against Gregory & Stagg to recover
possession of the whiskey, plaintiff claiming that the sale to him
was made by Taylor under the above agreement.
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The answer of Gregory & 6tagg admitted that tne agreement
was entered into, but insisted that it did not authorize Taylor to sell
and convey title to the whiskey covered by their receipt. The
evidence showed that transactions under this agreement between
Taylor and Gregory & Stagg, were had to the amount of at least
$150,000, but that there was in the meantime, only one sale by
Taylor of whiskey for which Gregory & Stagg held receipt. This
last-mentioned sale by Taylor was sanctioned by Gregory & Stagg,
accompanied with the suggestion that they preferred that, in the
future, their approbation should be obtained by Taylor before
making sale of whiskey for which they held receipts. This transaction was prior to the sale by Taylor to Farmer, but unknown to
the latter.
On the trial defendant offered parol evidence to explain the above
agreement, and this evidence was admitted by the court. A verdict was rendered for defendant, and judgment entered thereon,
whereupon this appeal was taken.
J. & J. W. Bodman, for appellant.
. P.

). Bush and 1). WV'. Lindey, for appellee.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
HINES, J.-Instruction No. 5, given by the court below, requires
as a condition precedent to the liability of Gregory & Stagg, first
that the jury shall find that Gregory & Stagg authorized Taylor to
sell the whiskey; and second, that Gregory & Stagg authorized
Taylor to issue a warehouse receipt therefor. It was error in the
court to make the right of recovery depend upon the establishment
of both these facts, when proof of the authority to sell carries with
it, as an incident, the right to issue the warehouse receipt. The
property in the whiskey, where the sale is made with the consent
and by authority of the holder of the first receipt, passes to the
purchaser, regardless of the fact of the issuing or surrender of
receipts.
Section 7 of the Warehouse Act of 1869, does not apply to a case
like this. That portion of the section forbidding the issuing of a
second receipt without the production of the prior receipt accompanied by the written consent of the holder of the prior receipt, is
in the interest of commerce and of the negotiability of such receipts
and for the protection of the holder of the second receipt. It is
VoL. XXVI.-82
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for the prevention of fraud, and not to encourage it; as would be
the case if the holder of the first receipt were permitted to repudi
ate the oral authority, given to the original owner of the property,
by which he obtains the money of an innocent purchaser for value
who has been misled by the silence of the first receipt-holder, who
permits the original owner to retain possession with every indicia
of ownership. The holder of the first receipt who gives the oral
authority to sell is as much estopped to deny the authority to sell
and the title in the innocent purchaser as he could be if he had
stood by in person and acquiesced in the sale without asserting
claim. Any other construction would sanction and encourage combinations for the perpetration of frauds that would effectually defeat
the beneficial purposes designed to be accomplished by the passage
of the Warehouse Act.
The written evidence of the agreement between Taylor and Gregory & Stagg is entitled to as much consideration as if they bad
each signed it. The object of reducing th6 terms of a contract to
writing is to make them certain, and the object of the signature is
to identify the writing and to make manifest the fact of deliberation
accompanying the consummation of the contract. These objects
.may be accomplished, as in this instance, by reducing the terms to
writing, by delivery, acceptance, and the conduct of business under
the agreement, as effectually as if the signatures of the parties were
appended. The terms of a contract thus executed must be taken
to speak the solkmn agreement of the parties, and can no more be
altered, added to or varied than any other written contract, which
purports on its face to contain the whole of the agreement between
the parties. If parol evidence were permitted, in the absence of
an allegation of fraud or mistake, to effect it, the same evidence
would be competent as bearing upon the same writing when signed
by the parties entering into the agreement. If the writing appeared
upon its face to be a loose or incomplete memorandum of an agreement, parol evidence would be competent, without alleging fraud
or mistake, to show what the contract in fact was; but it is not
such a memorandum, and the effect of the oral evidence admitted
is to show that the terms used by the contracting parties did not
express their meaning. It is true that Stagg testifies that the
writing does not contain the whole of the agreement, and that it
was not understood to authorize Taylor to sell whiskey for which
Gregory & Stagg held warehouse receipts; but the same might be
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said of every deliberately-written contract, and the conservative
rule excluding parol evidence thereby effectually nullified.
The expression in the writing exhibited, "We to have one dollar
per bbl. on sales in bond of all goods advanced on, whether we sell
or you make the sale, and 2J per cent. on all tax-paid goods
advanced on, sold by us or you," taken in connection with the
whole tenor of the instrument, manifestly makes it a dispositive
document, which was intended to confer upon Taylor the authority
to sell whiskey upon which advances have been made by Gregory
& Stagg. As to the simple question of the authority to sell, the
language is unequivocal and without ambiguity, and cannot, therefore, be contradicted, added to or varied without allegation and
proof of mistake or fraud. The authority to sell being without
limitation or condition, to permit parol evidence to establish that
the sales were to be made upon condition that the permission of
Gregory & Stagg should be first obtained, would be to make a new
contract between Taylor and Gregory & Stagg, and consequently
to annul the written agreement. All the circumstances surrounding the contracting parties at the time of making tle contract evidenced by the writing, as well as the manner in which they transacted business under the agreement, prior to the purchase by
appellant, may be shown, to determine whether there was othei
whiskey in the hands of Taylor belonging to Gregory & Stagg, for
which they held no warehouse receipts, and to which, therefore, the
authority to sell may have been intended to extend, instead of to
such as, under. their agreement, was to be covered by the warehouse receipts. Such evidence would be competent for the purpose of identifying the subject-matter of the contract, but not for
the purpose of showing that the parties did not mean what the
language of their agreement naturally imports: Greenleaf, vol. 1.
secs. 281-2; Whart. on Evid., secs. 920-3; Castleman v. Southern Mutual Lzfe Insurance Company, 14 Bush 197.
For the reasons suggested, we conclude that the court erred in
instructing the jury as to the law of the case, and in admitting
Stagg to testify as to his understanding of the meaning of the
terms used in the written instrument, and also in permitting him
to state, in the present condition of the pleadings, that the writing
did not contain all the terms of the contract entered into between
Taylor and Gregory & Stagg at the time the writing was made.
Judgment reversed, and cause remanded, with direction for further proceeding.
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upreme Court of Tennessee.
VANCE v. PH(ENIX INSURANCE CO.
Directors of a corporation are required to show reasonable capacity for the position,
scrupulous good faith, and the exercise of their best judgment.
Directors, who act in good faith and with reasonable care and diligence, but never-

theless fall into a mistake, either of law or fact, are not personally liable for the
consequence of such mistake.
The by-laws of a corporation provided that the board of directors should elect a
secretary, whose term of office should be twelve months or until his successor was
elected, and who was to give bond with security for the faithful discharge of his
duties. The board elected a secretary, and took the prescribed bond, and re-elected
the same person secretary for several successive years, but took no new bond, supposing, after consideration and discussion of the question, but without taking legal

advice, that the bond taken was a continuing security during those years.

The

secretary became a defaulter in the third year. Held, that the directors, who were
g6od and efficient business men, stockholders of the corporation, and acting in good

faith, were not liable to make good the loss.

BL by one stockholder of the Phoenix Insurance Company,
upon the refusal of the company to bring the suit, to hold the
directors of the company, during the year 1872 and 1873, individually liable for losses occasioned by their neglect to take an
official bond from the secretary of the company, in accordance with
the by-laws of the corporation.
By the charter the board of directors were authorized to appoint
a secretary, &c., and to take from such secretary or other officers,
such bonds and securities as may be prescribed by said board of
directors. The company organized in February 1871, and adopted
by-laws, prescribing, inter alia: "At the first regular meeting after
the election of directors, the newly-elected board shall elect a president, secretary and assistant secretary, whose term of office shall be
for twelve months, or until their successors are elected."
Another by-law was: "The secretary, after his election, shall
give bond with satisfactory security to the board of directors, in the
sum of $30,000, conditioned for the faithful discharge of his duties,
and a failure to give such bond shall cause a forfeiture of his office."
Other by-laws gave the secretary: "Special care and control over
all books, papers and other documents" of the company; directed
him to make regular deposits in bank of the money of the company,
and authorized the money to be drawn out only on his check.
In February 1871, the board of directors appointed B. F. White
secretary of the company, and took from him a bond, with satisfac-
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tory security, in the penalty of 830,000, conditioned to faithfully perform his duty as such secretary, and in all respects properly demean
himself in his said office. White was re-elected secretary in February
1872, and again in February 1873, but gave no new bond on either
occasion, nor did the board require him to renew his bond. In 1873,
White became a defaulter in the sum of $11,328.35, and also issued
stock without authority, which the board of directors redeemed at an
expense of $3050. The individual defendants were stockholders
and members of the board of directors during the years 1872
and 1873. They received no compensation as directors, and gave
to the business of the company their personal attention, and such
attention, it was agreed, as men of ordinary prudence give their
own affairs. They were all, by the agreed statement of facts,
"good and efficient business men, several of them heads of large
mercantile and manufacturing establishments." "The defendants
supposed that the bond taken from White in 1871 was security for
White's acts in 1872 and 1873, and so long as he acted as secretary
of the company."
They considered and discussed the question of White's bond, and
their conclusion was that it covered his acts for the whole time he
should serve the company. In 1872 and 1873 they gave the business of said insurance company, and the sufficiency of White's bond,
that care and attention which prudent men give their own affairs.
They did not, however, take advice of counsel as to the sufficiency
of the bond or of its binding force, but acted on their own judgment
in regard to it until after White's defalcation occurred."
The chancellor dismissedthe bill, whereupon complainant appealed.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
COOPER, J-Directors of a corporation undoubtedly occupy a
fiduciary relation towards the stockholders, and are bound to good
faith and reasonable diligence in the performance of their duties.
They are consequently liable for losses occasioned by their positive
misconduct or neglect which warrants the imputation of fraud, or,
as it is sometimes vaguely expressed, shows a want of the knowledge
necessary for the discharge of their functions so great that they
were not justified in assuming the office. Where they are interested
in the stock of the company, and act without compensation, they
will, at the utmost, be held to answer for ordinary neglect, that is
for the omission of that care which every man of ordinary prudence
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gives to his own affairs. They do not undertake to be infallible. Foi
error, therefore, though it be in a matter of law, they are not in
general, liable. In fine, they are .required to show only a reasonable capacity for the position, scrupulous good faith, and the exercise
of their best judgment. These principles are recognised in our
decisions: Shea v. Knoxille & Ky. Railroad Jo., 6 Baxt. 277,
283; Shea v. Mabry, 1 Lea 819, 848. In this last case, it is
conceded that directors, who act in good faith, and with reasonable
care and diligence, but nevertheless fall into a mistake, either as to
law or fact, are not liable for the consequences of such mistake.
To the same effect are the authorities elsewhere: Turquandv. Marshall, Law Rep. 4 Oh. App. 876; Godbold v. Branch Bank, 11
Ala. 191 ; Spering's Appeal, 71 Penn. St. 11; Scott v. Depester,
1 Edw. Oh. 513; Hodges v. NYew England S&rew Co., 1 R. I.
312; s. o. 3 R. I. 9.
The act complained of in this case was the failure to take from
the secretary a new bond upon his re-election in 1872, and again
in 1873, upon the supposition that the bond given in 1871, did
not bind the sureties beyond the re-election at the end of the first
twelve months. It has been held that the failure to require the
secretary of a corporation to give a bond, would make the president, whose duty it was to take the bond, liable for the defalcation
of the secretary: PontchartrainRailroad Co. v. Paulding, 11
La. Rep. 41. If this be conceded to be good law, as perhaps it
may, it would not necessarily fix liability on the defendants in the
present case, for the by-law only requires the secretary to give a
bond for the faithful discharge of his duties, and such a bond was
taken. The neglect of duty was in not requiring a new bond on
each re-election of the same person. If the- by-law had plainly
required a new bond each year, or if, the language of the by-law
admitting of doubt, the directors had come to the conclusion that a
new bond should be taken, the authority would have been in point;
so too, if the directors had known that, as matter of law, the
sureties would not be bound beyond the year, and yet neglected to
require a bond. The by-law does not, however, plainly require a
new bond each year, and the agreed statement of facts concedes that
the defendants considered and discussed "the question of the
bond' and reached the conclusion that the bond taken covered his
acts for the whole time he should serve the company." It was at
most a mistake of law, on errors of judgment, for which, without
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more, they would not be liable. There is of course, no pretence
for charging the defendants upon the ground of a want of knowledge necessary to discharge their functions, so great that they were
not justified in assuming the office, for it is conceded that they
were "good and efficient business men, several of them the heads
of large mercantile and manufacturing establishments." Now, can
they be charged with neglect of duty, it being agreed that they
gave to the business of the company, and the matter of the secretary's bond, "that care and attention which prudent men give
their own affairs." It is not pretended that there was any bad
faith. There is, therefore, clearly no ground for holding the
defendants liable, unless it be for failing to take legal advice.
But, the very fact that a mistake of law will not, of itself, create
liability, necessarily implies that such a mistake may be committed
without legal advice. Some of the cases do hold that acting under
legal advice may tend to protect against liability, while none of
them decide that its absence insures liability. Ordinarily, the
advice of counsel will not protect a trustee: Perry on Trusts,
9 927. Nor shield any person from the consequences of a wrongful
or illegal act: Kendriek v. Cypert, 10 Humph. 291. The true rule
in this class of cases is that if the directors feel any doubts as to
the law, they may be guilty of neglect if they fail to seek and be
guided by competent legal advice, and this for the obvious reason
that they would, under like circumstances, seek such advice in the
management of their private affairs.
The chancellor's decree is affirmed with costs.

Supreme Court of Missouri.
KEITH

ET AL.

V. HOBBS.

State courts have the right to inquire into the validity of a patent for an invention
issued by the United States when the question comes up collaterally, as where an
action on a promissory note given in consideration of the assignment of an interest
in a patent is defended on the ground that the patent is void.
It is a good defence to an action on a promissory note given in consideration of
the assignment of the right to make, use and vend a patented article within a limited
territory, that while the specifications accompanying the letters-patent call for water
as one of the ingredients to be used in the composition of the article, the waters in
commnn use in a portion of the territory sold, by reason of their alkaline properties,
or for other reasons, will not produce the desired result. Such specifications are
insufficient, the patent is void, and the assignment constitutes no"consideration for
the note.
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ERROR to Jackson Circuit Court.
This was an action on a note. Defendants' answer admitted the
execution of the note, and alleged total failure of consideration, and
also fraudulent representations by"plaintiffs as to the patent right,
the sale of which constituted the consideration for the note sued on.
At the trial there was testimony on the part of defendants tending to show that the patent right sold defendants by plaintiffs, was
of no value, and testimony on the part of plaintiffs tending to show
that it was valuable and useful. There was also testimony tending
to prove fraud and to disprove it as alleged. Defendants read in
evidence the letters-patent to plaintiffs, No. 78,672, for the invention described in said letters-patent as a new and useful "improved
composition for tanning." The sale of the right to make, use and
vend this composition, in certain states and territories, one of which
was Colorado, was the sole consideration of the note sued on.
Defendants also read the schedule annexed to and forming a part
of the letters patent. In this schedule, water is mentioned as one
of the necessary ingredients to be used in preparing the composition. The quantity to be used is indicated in the schedule, but the
schedule does not mention any particular kind of water, except that
it must be boiling water. The evidence also tended to show that
the waters of Colorado in general use would not accomplish the end
for which water was used in the composition, by reason of their
alkaline qualities or otherwise, and also that the composition was
worthless and could not be used in tanning leather.
A. Comingo, for plaintiffs in error.
Bryant & Molmem, for defendants in error.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
NORTON, J.-The court, at the instance of plaintiffs, gave three
instructions, substantially as follows: 1. That notwithstanding the
jury should find that the defendants failed to use the tanning composition successfully, they must find for the plaintiffs as to the first
defence, unless defendants showed that the composition was wholly
useless, and could not be successfully used by practical tanners as a
means or in the process of tanning. 2. That if the composition was
valuable, the jury would find -for plaintiffs as to the first defence,
notwithstanding defendants had failed to use it successfully. 3.
That the jury must find for plaintiffs as to the alleged fraudulent
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representations, unless they were actually made, were known to be
false when made, and defendants were thereby induced, &c., &c.
Defendants asked six instructions, as follows: 1. That in order
to support the letters-patent in evidence, it is absolutely necessary
that the alleged improved composition for tanning be new, and
should the jury be satisfied from the evidence, either that the
leather produced by said composition was not as good in quality at
a cheaper price, or that it was not better in quality at the same
I-rice, as leather manufactured by the old and usual process, then
said composition is not new within the meaning of the law, and fbr
that reason said letters-patent are void; there was no consideration
for the note sued on, and the verdict must be for the defendants.
2. The jury are instructed that the inventor should confine his
specifications to substances which he knows will answer the purpose
for which they are used; that the specification accompanying the
letters-patent, read in evidence, makes use of the general term
water; and if the jury believe from the evidence that the waters of
the territory of Colorado in general use will not accomplish the end
for which water is used in the said composition, either by reason of
their alkaline properties or otherwise, then the specification is
insufficient, and the letters-patent are void; there was no consideration for the note sued on, and the verdict must be for the
defendants.
3. The jury are instructed that if they believe from the evidence
that the alleged improved composition is worthless, and cannot be
beneficially used for the purpose of tanning leather, or if the jury
should be satisfied, from the testimony, that any one or more of
the ingredients mentioned in the specifications as essential, is
either disadvantageous, or utterly useless, then, and in either of
said cases, the letters-patent are void, and the verdict should be
for the defendants.
4. The jury are instructed that the letters-patent are prima
facie evidence that the plaintiffs are the joint inventors of the
so-called improved composition, yet that fact may be disproved;
and if the jury should be satisfied, from the testimony, that said
composition was invented by the plaintiff, Keith, alone, and not
by Keith & Eylar jointly, the letters-patent are void; there was
no consideration for the note sued on, and the verdict must be for
the defendants.
5. The court instructs the jury that the specification accompaVor. XXKVII.-83

658

KEITh v. HOBBS.

nying the letters-patent, read in evidence, must in and of itself
contain a full, clear and exact description of the invention, and if
the object of the alleged patent improved composition for tanning
cannot be obtained when the specification is fairly followed out, by
competent workmen, of ordinary skill and proficiency in the art
of tanning, without invention or addition of their own, or if in
order to obtain the object of the patent, information must be
derived from other sources than the specification as by experiments
or from using other methods to make the thing described; or if it
requires the solution of a problem; then, and in either of said
cases, the letters-patent are void, and the note sued on is without
any consideration, and the jury must find for the defendants.
The sixth instruction for defendants i. substantially the same
as plaintiffs' third. The court gave all defendants' instructions
except the first. Plaintiffs took a nonsuit with leave to move to
set aside, and filed a motion accordingly, which was overruled, and
plaintiffs excepted.
The plaintiffs insist that the *action of the court in giving the
declarations of law asked by defendants was erroneous, because
they are inconsistent with those given for plaintiffs, because they
are not predicated on the pleadings, and because the court had no
jurisdiction to inquire into the validity of the patent for which
the note in suit was given. Counsel have not attempted to p'oint
out the alleged inconsistency between the instructions given on
the part of plaintiffs and defendants, and we are unable to perceive
that it exists. Nor are we able to discover that the instructions
are not predicated on the pleadings and facts in evidence. The
defence to the note is founded on the theory of want of consideraof
tion and fraudulent representation on the part of the vendors
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jurisdiction, and that it could not be exercised by the state courts.
But it is equally clear that where the validity of a patent is called
in question or arises' collaterally in a proceeding of which a state
court has jurisdiction, such court may then pass upon the question.
In the case of Billinqs v. Ame8, 32 Mo. 265, where the validity
of a patent was collaterally questioned, it was held that, "it
is
insisted by appellants that this is virtually a suit for an infringement
of a patent, and is, therefore, only cognisable in the Federal courts.
We think differently. It is a suit on a contract in which the patent
is brought in collaterally; and while it is settled that the validity
of a patent-right is a subject peculiarly within the jurisdiction of
the courts of the United States, it is equally well settled that when
it comes in question collaterally, its validity may become a subject
of inquiry in the state courts." So in iSlemmer's Appeal, 58 Penn.
St. 155, 163, SHARSWOOD, J., observes: "The Act of Congress
of July 4th 1836, section 17th, provides, 'that all actions, suits,
controversies and cases arising under any law of the United States
granting or confirming to inventors the exclusive right to their
inventions or discoveries, shall be originally cognisable, as well
in
equity as at law, by the Circuit Courts of the United States.' It has
been held in the construction of this and former acts on the same
subject, that the jurisdiction thus conferred upon the Federal courts
is exclusive, so that the state courts have no cognisance of either
actions at law or bills in equity in which the validity of a patent
is directly involved. * * * But though patent-rights are peculiarly within the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States, yet
it is undoubtedly true that when they come in question collaterally
their validity may become a subject of inquiry in the state courts.
Thus in a suit upon a promissory note, if it is set up as a defence
that *theconsideration was the sale of a patent-right, and that the
patent is void, so that in fact there was no consideration, the state
courts constantly exercise jurisdiction. * * * Accordingly the
courts of the United States refuse to take cognisance of cases
between citizens of the same state, when they involve not the infringement of a patent, but controversies growing out of contracts
of .which it is merely the subject-matter: Goodyear v. Day,
1
Blatch. 565; Burr v. Gregory, 2 Paine 426; Brook8 v. Stolley,
3 McLean 523." To the same effect are the following cases:
Rich v. Hotchkins, 16 Conn. 409; Lindsay v. .Roraback, 4 Jones
Eq. (N. C.) 124; 8herman v. Champlain Transportation Co., 31

